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Introduction
In the aftermath of the …nancial crisis, central banks around the world have pursued a range of unconventional policies to stabilize their economies. The …rst of these has been driving the policy rate to the zero lower bound (denoted ZLB). Another has been to inject large amounts of liquidity into the economy via large scale asset purchases, also known as quantitative easing (denoted QE).
These two policy actions have generated a substantial debate in the economics profession about the role of monetary policy at the ZLB and the e¢ cacy of QE. First, is hitting the ZLB a problem for a central bank? Second, what are the theoretical channels causing QE to have real e¤ects at the ZLB?
Regarding the …rst question, in several monetary models 1 driving the nominal interest rate to zero, also known as the Friedman rule, is not a constraint. It is instead the optimal policy, and as such it should be implemented all of the time and not just during severe economic downturns. 2 In New Keynesian models, instead, a demand shock of some sort drives the "natural" real interest su¢ ciently negative. The central bank would like to have a negative nominal interest rate but because of sticky prices and the ZLB the equilibrium real interest rate is too high and economic activity is ine¢ ciently low. In all these models, once the nominal interest rate is zero there is no further role for monetary policy. The Friedman rule is associated with a "liquidity trap" and varying the quantity of money in the economy has no real or nominal e¤ects -households will simply hold onto the excess cash since it is costless to do so.
Regarding the second question, conventional QE policy involves printing money to buy government bonds and/or private assets. Consequently, QE alters the size and composition of a central bank's balance sheet. However, why should the size or the composition of the central bank balance sheet matter for the real economy? In short, does Modigliani-Miller apply to a central bank's balance sheet or not? Wallace (1981) showed that it does and thus QE-type policies will be ineffective. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) show a similar result in a New Keynesian model once the ZLB is reached. Moreover, at the ZLB, money and bonds are perfect substitutes. Exchanging one for the other has no real or nominal e¤ects. 3 In a New Monetarist model, Williamson (2014) shows QE can ‡atten the yield curve, but it also leads to an 1 increase in real rates and a decrease in in ‡ation at the ZLB, much unlike central bankers 'thinking. 4 In summary, showing theoretically that QE can have bene…cial real e¤ects has proven di¢ cult to achieve. 5 Yet, there is substantial empirical evidence showing that quantitative easing has non-trivial e¤ects on the yields of various …nancial assets. 6 This is why QE is perceived to have had bene…cial real e¤ects on the economy even at the ZLB. Consequently, there is a tension between theory and empirical evidence in terms of the e¤ects of QE on the real economy. This is best captured by Ben Bernanke's famous quote "The problem with QE is it works in practice but it doesn't work in theory." In the end, we are still confronted with the question of how QE can be bene…cial at the zero lower bound.
Another conundrum with recent experience is that if the ZLB corresponds to the Friedman rule, then this should be associated with de ‡ation. Japan is often cited as an example of this. However, in several of the major economies where the ZLB has been in place for many years, in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation are positive and lie between 1% and 2%. 7 So, why is de ‡ation not occurring in these economies? This puzzle gives rise to yet another one -with nominal interest rates at zero and expected in ‡ation anchored between 1% and 2%, some agents in the economy are willing to accept a negative ex-ante real rate of return on their assets several years out into the future. Why are they willing to do so?
Our objective is to build a New Monetarist model that can be used to address the questions and observations discussed above. Speci…cally, we amend the New Monetarist model of Berentsen and Waller (2011) by incorporating heterogeneous preferences across agents as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) . We then study the optimal stabilization response of the central bank to demand shocks that hit the economy. Heterogeneity takes the form of agents receiving iid shocks to their current discount factor. Speci…cally, in each period, some agents receive shocks such that their discount factor is higher than for the others. We refer to the former agents as patient and the latter ones as impatient. In this setup, patient agents are savers and they are the marginal investors who price assets. We show that the ZLB may be the best interest rate policy the central bank can implement, although that is not always the case due to a price externality. Nevertheless, even when the Friedman rule is the best policy, it is always second best since only the patient agents are unconstrained in their holdings of real balances. The impatient agents, instead, are still constrained and carry fewer real balances across time. Why? The nominal interest rate is too high at zero for them as the e¤ective nominal rate they face is still positive. The policymaker would like to drive down the nominal interest rate into negative territory to lower the opportunity cost for impatient agents to carry cash, but is constrained in its ability to do so.
We then consider a particular form of QE whereby the central bank purchases private debt via repo arrangements. Since the repos are undone at a later date, QE is a temporary policy, not a permanent increase in the size of the central bank balance sheet. We show that, under this form of QE in response to demand shocks, the central bank is able to temporarily relax the liquidity constraint on impatient agents. This improves their welfare without harming the patient agents. Interestingly, our model also suggests that it can be bene…cial for the central bank to buy private debt claims instead of government debt. In this sense, the purchases of mortgage backed securities conducted by the Fed are consistent with our model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that due to the pricing externality mentioned before, QE may also have bene…cial general equilibrium e¤ects for the patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their holdings of real balances. 8 Consequently, QE at the ZLB is welfare improving for some if not all agents.
As is common in the New Keynesian literature [e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Bhattarai, Eggertsson and Gafarov (2013) ], we then consider a temporary, unanticipated shock to the discount factor. We focus on a shock such that patient agents have a discount factor greater than one. This in turn implies that patient agents are willing to take negative real rates of interest over a short period of time. We show that in this case maintaining the ZLB will generate positive expected in ‡ation in the short run. As before, QE continues to be e¤ective in improving welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 studies stationary monetary equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the optimal in ‡ation rate in an economy without aggregate demand shocks. Section 6 studies optimal stabilization policy at the ZLB in response to aggregate demand shocks. Section 7 concludes.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
The model builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) , Boel and Camera (2006) and Berentsen and Waller (2011) . Time is discrete, the horizon is in…nite and there is a large population of in…nitely-lived agents who consume perishable goods and discount only across periods. In each period agents may visit two sequential rounds of trade -we will refer to the …rst as DM and the second as CM.
Rounds of trade di¤er in terms of economic activities and preferences. In the DM, agents face an idiosyncratic trading risk such that they either consume, produce, or are idle. An agent consumes with probability b , produces with probability s and is idle with probability 1 b s .
We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as sellers. Buyers get utility "u(q) from q > 0 consumption, where " is a preference parameter, u 0 (q) > 0, u 00 (q) < 0, u 0 (0) = +1 and u 0 (1) = 0.
Furthermore, we impose that the elasticity of utility e(q) = qu 0 (q)=u(q) is bounded. Producers incur a utility cost c(y) from supplying y 0 labor to produce y goods, with c 0 (y) > 0, c 00 (y) 0 and c 0 (0) = 0. Everyone can consume and produce in the CM. As in Lagos and Wright (2005) , agents have quasilinear preferences U (x) n, where the …rst term is utility from x consumption, and the second is disutility from n labor to produce n goods. We assume U 0 (x) > 0, U 00 (x) 0, U 0 (0) = +1 and U 0 (1) = 0. Also, let q be the solution to "u 0 (q) = c 0 [( b = s )q] and let x be the solution to U 0 (x) = 1.
Shocks
The economy is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic demand shocks, but agents are heterogeneous only with respect to the latter. Speci…cally, at the beginning of each CM, agents draw an idiosyncratic time-preference shock z 2 f L ; H g determining their interperiod discount factor. This implies at the beginning of each period an agent can be either patient (type H) with probability or impatient (type L) with probability 1
. We consider the case 0 < L < < H < 1 with no serial correlation in the draws and being the average discount factor. Note that timepreference shocks introduce ex-post heterogeneity across households, but the long-run distribution of time preferences is invariant.
We also assume " is stochastic like in Berentsen and Waller (2011) , which allows us to study the optimal response of a central bank to aggregate demand shocks. The random variable " has support = ["; "], with 0 < " < " < 1. Shocks are serially uncorrelated and f (") denotes the density function of ". As shown below, output in the CM is constant so any volatility in total 4 output per period is driven by " shocks in the DM.
Information frictions, money and credit
The preference structure we selected generates a single-coincidence problem in the DM since buyers do not have a good desired by sellers. Moreover, two additional frictions characterize the DM. First, agents are anonymous as in Kocherlakota (1998) 
Policy tools
We assume a government exists that is in charge of monetary policy and is the only supplier of …at money, of which an initial stock M 0 > 0 exists. Monetary policy has both a long-run and a short-run component. The long-run policy focuses on the trend in ‡ation rate, whereas the shortrun one is concerned with the output stabilization response to aggregate shocks. We denote the gross growth rate of money supply by = M t =M t 1 , where M t denotes the money stock in the CM in period t. The central bank implements its long-term in ‡ation goal by providing deterministic lump-sum injections of money = ( 1)M t 1 , which are given to private agents at the beginning of the CM. If > 1, agents receive lump-sum transfers of money, whereas for < 1 the central bank must be able to extract money via lump-sum taxes from the economy.
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The central bank implements its short-term stabilization policy through state-contingent changes in the stock of money. We let 1 (") = T 1 (")M t 1 and 2 (") = T 2 (")M t 1 denote state-contingent cash injections received by private agents in the DM and CM respectively. We assume injections in the DM are undone in the CM, so that 1 (") + 2 (") = 0. Changes in 1 (") thus a¤ect the money stock in the DM without a¤ecting the long-term in ‡ation rate in the CM. This means that the long-term in ‡ation rate is still deterministic since = ( 1)M t 1 is not state dependent. Note that the state-contingent injections of cash can be viewed as a type of repurchase agreement -the central bank sells money in the DM under the agreement that it is being repurchased in the CM.
E¢ cient allocation
We start by discussing the allocation selected by a benevolent planner subject to the same physical and informational constraints faced by the agents. We will refer to this allocation as constrainede¢ cient. The environment's frictions imply the planner can observe neither types nor identities in the DM and therefore has no ability to transfer resources across agents over time in that market.
Therefore, the planning problem in the DM corresponds to a sequence of static maximization problems subject to the technological constraints. This implies in the DM the planner must solve:
In the CM, instead, the planner can transfer resources across agents over time. Therefore, in that market she chooses consumption and labor sequences fx j0 ; x j1 ; ::g and fn j0 ; n j1 ; ::g for j = H; L that maximize a weighted sum of individual utility functions subject to feasibility and non-negativity constraints:
n Lt for t = 0; 1; 2; :::
s.t. n jt 0 for j = H; L and t = 0; 1; 2; :::
Here H and L are positive utility weights. A solution to this problem is characterized by:
where j t denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint on n jt . Note that the di¤erence between equation (3) and (4) implies a di¤erent allocation when t = 0 than when t 1. The social planner problem is therefore time inconsistent. These di¤erences, however, disappear when j t = 0. Therefore, the time-consistent solution to the planner's problem consists in n jt > 0 and therefore U 0 (x jt ) = 1 for j = H; L and t 0. The planner wants both types to work and consume a constant and equal amount in every period.
In sum, in the constrained-e¢ cient allocation marginal consumption utility equals marginal production disutility in each market and in every period. Such allocation is therefore stationary
thus implying equal consumption for type H and type L agents. This allocation is the relevant benchmark in our study, and we will refer to it as e¢ cient.
Stationary monetary allocations
In what follows, we want to determine if the constrained-e¢ cient allocation can be decentralized in a monetary economy with competitive markets. 9 Thus, we focus on stationary monetary outcomes such that end-of-period real money and bonds balances are time invariant.
We simplify notation omitting t subscripts and use a prime superscipt and a 1 subscript to denote variables corresponding to the next and previous period respectively. We let p 1 and p 2 denote the nominal price of goods in the DM and the CM respectively of an arbitrary period t. We also let j and z denote the discount factors drawn in period t 1 and t respectively. In addition, we normalize all nominal variables by p 2 , so that DM trades occur at the real price p = p 1 =p 2 . In this manner, the timing of events in any period t can be described as follows.
An arbitrary agent of type j = H; L enters the DM in period t with a portfolio ! j = (m j ; a j ) listing m j = m( j ) real money holdings and a j = a( j ) loans (or savings) from the preceding period when he experienced a time-preference shock j . Trading shocks k and aggregate demand shocks " are then realized and agents receive a lump-sum transfer 1 (") = T 1 (")M 1 . After the DM closes, the agent enters the CM with portfolio ! k j = (m k j ; a j ), where m k j = m k j ( j ; ") denotes money holdings carried over from the DM and k = s; b; o denotes the trading shock experienced in the DM. Here, o identi…es an idle agent, while b and s identify a buyer and a seller respectively. Thus, if we let q j = q( j ; ") denote consumption and y j = y( j ; ") production in the DM, individual real money holdings for an agent j evolve as follows:
That is, buyers deplete balances by pq j while sellers increase them by py j . Idiosyncratic timepreference shocks z are realized at the beginning of the CM. Left-over cash is then used to trade and settle bonds positions and x and n are respectively consumption bought and production sold in the CM. Note that bonds positions a j at the beginning of the CM are not a¤ected by trading shocks in the DM, since they can only be used in the CM. Agents also receive lump-sum transfers Since we focus on stationary equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are time and state invariant so that M=p 2 = M 0 =p 0 2 , we have that
which implies the in ‡ation rate equals the growth rate of money supply. The government budget constraint therefore is:
Note that the long-run in ‡ation rate is deterministic since the per capita lump-sum transfers in the CM are not state dependent.
The CM problem
Given the recursive nature of the problem, we use dynamic programming to analyze the problem of an agent j at any date, with j = H; L. We let V (! j ) denote the expected lifetime utility for an agent entering the DM with portfolio ! j before shocks are realized. We also let W z (! k j ) denote the expected lifetime utility from entering the CM with portfolio ! k j and receiving a discount factor shock z at the beginning of the CM. The agent's problem at the start of the CM then is:
where A 0 is a constant denoting an exogenous borrowing constraint. The resources available to the agent in the CM depend on the realization of the DM trading shock k, as well as the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks ", j and z . Speci…cally, an agent has m k j real balances carried over from the DM and is able to borrow a 0 z (or lend if a 0 z < 0) at a price p a . Other resources are n k jz receipts from current sales of goods and lump-sum transfers + 2 . These resources can be used to …nance current consumption x j , to pay back loans a j and to carry m 0 z real money balances into 9 next period. The factor = p 0 2 =p 2 multiplies a 0 z and m 0 z because the budget constraint is expressed in real terms.
Rewriting the constraint in terms of n k jz and substituting into (8) yields:
Note that here we are focusing on a stationary equilibrium in which all agents provide a positive labor e¤ort. Conditions for n k jz > 0 are in the Appendix, but the intuition is that agents will always choose to work in the CM if the borrowing limit A is tight enough. It follows that in a stationary monetary economy we must have:
This result depends on the quasi linearity of the CM preferences and the use of competitive pricing.
It implies that the marginal valuation of real balances and bonds in the CM are identical and do not depend on the agent's current type z or past type j, wealth ! k j or trade shock. This allows us to disentangle the agents'portfolio choices from their trading histories since
i.e. the agent's expected value from having a portfolio ! k j at the start of a CM is the expected value from having no wealth, W z (0), letting ! j = (0; 0) 0, plus the current real value of net wealth m k j a j . Note also that everyone consumes identically in the CM since:
which also implies x = x . That is, everyone consumes the same amount x independent of current type and past shocks, the reason being that agents in the CM can produce any amount at constant marginal cost. Thus, goods market clearing in the CM requires:
where N k = 2 n k HH + (1 )(n k LH +n k HL )+(1 ) 2 n k LL is labor e¤ort for all agents who experienced a trading shock in the DM, with k = b; s; o. Let m z 0 denote the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraint for money. Also, let a z denote the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. The …rst order conditions for the optimal portfolio choice then are:
The left hand sides of the expressions above de…ne the marginal cost of the assets. The right hand sides de…ne the expected marginal bene…t from holding the asset, either money or bonds, discounted according to time preferences and in ‡ation. From (12) and (13) we know that money holdings m 0 z and bonds a 0 z are independent of trading histories and past demand shocks, but instead depend on the current type z and the expected marginal bene…t of holding money and bonds in the DM, which may di¤er across types. We will study this next.
The DM problem
An agent with a portfolio ! j at the opening of the DM before aggregate demand and trading shocks are realized has expected lifetime utility:
First, we determine y j . The seller's problem depends on the current disutility of production and the expected continuation value. Speci…cally, the seller's problem can be written as:
for which the …rst order conditions, together with (5) and (9), give:
Note that (16) implies production is not type dependent, i.e. y j = y for j = H; L. Now, we determine q j . A buyer's problem is:
The budget constraint re ‡ects that consumption can be …nanced with both money holdings and DM transfers. Let b j denote the multiplier on the buyer's budget constraint. Using (5) and (9), the …rst order conditions for the buyer's problem imply:
From (16) and (18) we know that if the buyer is constrained and
If instead the buyer is unconstrained and therefore
Last, an idle agent's problem is simply:
Goods market clearing therefore requires:
Monetary equilibrium
To …nd optimal savings for an agent j use (8), (14), (15), (16) and (17) to obtain:
The expected lifetime utility V (! j ) therefore depends on the agent's net wealth and income m j a j + 1 and two other elements: the expected continuation payo¤
and the expected surplus from trade in the DM. With probability b the agent spends pq j on consumption deriving utility "u(q j ) and with probability s , instead, he gets disutility c(y) from production and earns py from his sales. Note that, unlike in the representative-agent case, the expected earnings p(y q j ) from DM trades might be di¤erent from zero since amounts produced and consumed by an agent j = H; L may be mismatched. Hence, we have:
and
which imply money is valued dissimilarly by agents, whereas bonds are valued identically in the economy. Combining (12) with (20) and (13) with (21) one gets that in a monetary equilibrium the following Euler equations must hold:
The expression in (22) tells us that the choice of real balances depends on three components. The …rst two are standard: the discount factor j at the beginning of the period and the real yield on cash 1= . The third component is "u 0 (q j )=c 0 (y). This can be interpreted as the expected liquidity premium from having cash available in the DM and it arises because money is needed to trade in that market. This premium grows with the severity of the cash constraint and the likelihood of a consumption shock b . The expression in (23), instead, refers to the choice of bonds, which depends on the discount factor z drawn at the beginning of the CM and the real yield 1= p a .
Note that (23) implies that bonds have no liquidity premium. That is because they are always held until maturity and cannot be used to buy consumption in the DM.
We can now de…ne the equilibrium as the set of values of m j and a z for j; z = H; L that solve (22) and (23). The reason is that once the equilibrium stocks of money and bonds are determined, all other endogenous variables can be derived.
De…nition 1 A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium consists of a m j satisfying (22) and a z satisfying (23) for j; z = H; L.
We now want to investigate whether a CM to CM bond a z for z = H; L would indeed circulate in this economy. We …nd that the following result holds:
Lemma 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium exists with impatient agents borrowing and patient agents lending at a price p a = H = . Speci…cally, a L = A and a H = (1 )A= .
Why are agents interested in trading such a bond in equilibrium? This is somewhat puzzling since we know from (10) they always consume the e¢ cient quantity x in the CM. This in turn implies that there is no reason for using bonds for consumption smoothing here due to the quasi linearity of preferences. Bonds, however, allow agents to smooth the labor e¤ort across periods -H agents prefer to work more today and less in the future, whereas L agents would rather do the opposite. 10
Once we know the price at which these bonds circulate in equilibrium, we can pin down their net nominal yield, which is:
We will refer to i as the nominal interest rate in this economy -note it is a¤ected directly by long-term monetary policy through . We now want to determine the returns on money and bonds that are consistent with equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Any stationary monetary equilibrium must be such that H , i.e. i 0.
This result derives from a simple no-arbitrage condition -in a monetary equilibrium, the value of money cannot grow too fast with < H or else type H agents will not spend it. 11 This, together with (24) , implies that to run the Friedman rule the monetary authority must let ! H and cannot target L instead.
Optimal in ‡ation rate
At this point, we know that given the result in Lemma 2 the monetary authority is constrained in its ability to give a rate of return on money that is attractive for everyone. Given this result, one should expect ine¢ ciencies will arise at i = 0 12 and therefore the Friedman rule might not be the optimal policy here. We investigate this next, and in this section we will focus on the optimal in ‡ation rate in an economy without aggregate demand shocks, which we will then reintroduce in Section 6. We …nd that the following result holds:
1 0 See Boel and Finocchiaro (2015) for an economy with borrowing and lending, where such a bond is traded even with permanent heterogeneity in discounting.
1 1 Other models with heterogeneous time preferences have analogous results, in that the rate of return on the asset cannot exceed the lowest rate of time preference. See for example Becker (1980) and Boel and Camera (2006) . In those models, however, types are …xed. 1 2 We know from (24) that it is equivalent to …x i or .
Proposition 1 Let i = 0. If c 00 (y) = 0, then q H = q and q L < q . If c 00 (y) > 0, then q H > q and q L < q .
Proposition 1 implies that, since agents value future consumption di¤erently, the Friedman rule fails to sustain the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in a monetary equilibrium. Indeed, even if the Friedman rule eliminates the opportunity cost of holding money for type H agents, it still fails to provide incentives for everyone to save enough since > L . That is because impatient agents are facing an e¤ective nominal interest rate equal to H = L 1, which is positive. We know from Lemma 2 that H and therefore the central bank is limited in its ability to reduce interest rates even further. Thus, type L agents remain constrained even at the ZLB.
Proposition 1 also implies that the nature of preferences has important consequences for the optimality of the Friedman rule. Speci…cally, a convex disutility from labor generates a price externality induced by type L agents. This happens because impatient agents consume too little even at = H , and therefore they drive down total output, marginal cost of production and relative price. The low price in turn induces type H agents to consume too much compared to the e¢ cient allocation. This price externality disappears with linear costs, since in that case the marginal cost of production (and hence the relative price in the DM) is constant at any level of output.
In light of the results described in Proposition 1, one must wonder if setting i = 0 is still the optimal monetary policy in this economy. The following result clari…es when this is the case.
Proposition 2 If c 00 (y) = 0, i = 0 is always the optimal policy. If c 00 (y) > 0, i = 0 is the optimal
The lesson here is that the Friedman rule is always the optimal policy with linear costs. In that case, even if i = 0 fails to sustain the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, such policy delivers a second best allocation that cannot be Pareto improved. With convex costs, however, the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal. Why not? Because the policy maker needs to take into account the price externality induced by the underconsumption of impatient agents. In this situation, Proposition 2 implies that i = 0 is optimal if two conditions hold. First, p = c 0 (y) 1, so that the relative price cannot be too low in order to limit the overconsumption of type H agents. Second, In this case, the optimal in ‡ation problem to be solved in a monetary equilibrium becomes:
If we di¤erentiate the objective function in (25), we …nd that the optimal must satisfy:
In the Appendix, we derive expressions for dq L =d and dq H =d from the constraint in (26) and let " = exp so that ln(") = 1. We …nd that in order for = H to be optimal in this case it must be that:
Intuitively, the condition above imposes an upper bound on time-preference heterogeneity. This will limit the price externality highlighted in Propositions 1 and 2, and the Friedman rule will be optimal with convex costs. Of course, if the condition above is not satis…ed, then i > 0 must 6 Optimal stabilization policy at the ZLB We now reintroduce aggregate demand shocks ". We will …rst investigate which ine¢ ciencies arise when the central bank does not engage in stabilization policy, i.e. when 1 (") = 2 (") = 0. We will call this passive policy and then compare it to active stabilization policy, i.e. the policy implemented by a central bank whose objective is to maximize the weighted welfare of the agents in the economy.
We will do so for i = 0. We …nd the following result holds with passive policy.
Proposition 3 Let i = 0 and 1 (") = 2 (") = 0. A unique monetary equilibrium exists for c 00 (y) 0 such that: with c 00 (y) = 0, then q L (") = q H (") = q (") for " " and q L (") < q H (") = q (") for " >", where" 2 [0; "]; with c 00 (y) > 0, then q L (") = q H (") = q (") for " " and
Proposition 3 implies that, with passive policy, impatient agents are unconstrained and consume q L (") = q (") in low marginal demand states. They are instead constrained in high demand states, and thus consume q L (") < q ("). Why don't type L ever consume q L (") > q (")? Because the price externality outlined in Proposition 1 cannot arise when all agents are unconstrained, and therefore q L (") = q H (") = q (") with c 00 (y) 0 in the low marginal demand states. Agents will use the extra cash to work less in the CM. Type H agents, instead, are never constrained, and they overconsume only in high demand states with c 00 (y) > 0.
We will now move to studying the problem of a central bank engaged in stabilization policy and thus maximizing welfare by choosing the quantities consumed and produced by each type j = H; L in each state subject to the constraint that the chosen quantities satisfy the conditions characterizing a competitive equilibrium. The policy is then implemented by choosing state-contingent injections 1 (") and 2 (") accordingly. The primal Ramsey problem faced by the central bank is: 13 M ax
Note that we are focusing on a monetary equilibrium such that m j > 0 for j = H; L. That is why the …rst two constraints in the Ramsey problem must hold with equality. Moreover, since i = 0, then (22) implies that "u 0 (q H (")) = c 0 (y(")) in every state, and the Ramsey planner simply solves 1 3 The objective function of the Ramsey problem faced by the central bank is:
where V (!j) is de…ned in (14). We know that trades are e¢ cient in the CM. Moreover, 1(") + 2(") = 0 and m = mH + (1 )mL. Therefore, the central bank has to worry only about maximizing
the following problem:
We …nd the following result holds:
Proposition 4 If i = 0, in a monetary equilibrium with m j > 0 for j = H; L the optimal policy is q L (") < q (") for all states with c 00 (y) 0.
Why does the Ramsey planner choose q L < q in all states? Because we know from Proposition 3 that without policy intervention agents L would have enough cash to buy q in low demand states.
In high demand states, however, their cash holdings would constrain their spending to q L < q .
This would create an ine¢ ciency of consumption across states that can be overcome by stabilization policy.
It is worth emphasizing that our aim here is to determine how stabilization policy can improve welfare compared to the allocation that would be achieved with a passive policy in which agents would only be able to rely on their money balances to …nance consumption in the DM. That is why Proposition 4 focuses on an equilibrium where m j (") > 0 for j = H; L. Of course the central bank could also provide L agents with enough liquidity to …nance q (") in every state, but in that case we would have m L (") = 0 in all states since L agents would have no incentive to bring any money.
Note that Proposition 4 also implies that the central bank is able to temporarily relax liquidity constraints on impatient agents at the ZLB. It can do so simply engaging in repo arrangements that are undone at a later date, i.e. 1 (") + 2 (") = 0:
Example 2 -stabilization policy with linear costs. We now want to get some intuition about optimal stabilization policy at the zero lower bound with di¤erent cost functions speci…cations. We will focus on linear costs …rst, and speci…cally we consider the following functional forms:
u(q) = 1 exp q and c(y) = y Derivations are in the Appendix, but it is worth pointing out that in this case we …nd that:
and q L (")=q L (") can be expressed as:
Since " > ", then it must be that 1 (") > 1 ("). Thus, the higher the demand for good, the higher the injection 1 (") needed to …nance the increase in consumption. (1991), Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Samwick (1998) who provide empirical estimates of distributions of discount factors.
The curve labeled "e¢ cient q L (")"represents the constrained-e¢ cient allocation at which q (") =
The curve "passive q L (")" represents equilibrium consumption for type L under a passive policy, whereas the curve "active q L (")"denotes consumption for the same agents when the central bank behaves optimally.
The important thing to notice here is that the central bank's optimal choice is strictly increasing in " -the central bank chooses to reduce consumption from the …rst best in low demand states in order to increase it in higher demand states.
Figure 2: Stabilization versus passive policy for type L agents -linear costs Example 3 -stabilization policy with convex costs. In this example, we focus on convex costs and consider the following functional forms:
u(q) = 1 exp q and c(y) = exp y 1
Derivations are in the Appendix. Figure 3 illustrates active and passive policies for type L in this example using the same parameter values we used for the linear cost function speci…cation. As in that case, the central bank's optimal choice is strictly increasing in " -the central bank chooses to reduce consumption from the …rst best in low demand states to increase it in higher demand states. Note that the central bank is not actively trying to stabilize consumption of patient agents. However, the short-term monetary policy aimed at stabilizing q L (") generates an externality on q H ("). Figure 4 illustrates. The important thing to notice here is that since q L < q in all states, type H agents always consume more than q in light of Proposition 1. We know from Proposition 3 that without policy intervention agents H would buy q in some states and q H > q in others.
Stabilization policy addresses this discontinuity indirectly and consumption is smoothed so that q H > q in all states. We now consider the following scenario. We are at the steady state and right before the CM opens the spread between H and L unexpectedly widens for only one period. Speci…cally, we consider the case 0 < L < < 1 < H for one period, but 0 < L < < H < 1 from then on with average invariant. Note that, given Lemma 2, a discount factor H > 1 implies a positive in ‡ation rate at the zero lower bound, and therefore a negative real interest rate. Note also that, with this particular structure, transversality conditions still hold for H agents in the CM in period t since their expected discount factor is lower than one after that, i.e. < 1. 14 The analytical results derived in the previous sections still hold even if the spread between the discount factors widens.
Quantitatively, however, results do change since from (22) we have:
and therefore dq j =d j > 0. Thus, as L decreases, impatient agents will become more constrained at the ZLB. We therefore investigate how the results from the Ramsey problem in this environment compare to the ones where the spread is narrower. For our numerical analysis, we consider H = 1:005 (consistent with an annual 2% in ‡ation) and L = 0:935, so that = 0:970 as in our previous exercises. All other parameters and functional forms remain invariant. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the results for impatient agents for the cases of linear and convex disutility respectively.
Figure 5: Stabilization versus passive policy for type L agents with positive in ‡ation -linear costs
active q L (ε) Figure 6 : Stabilization versus passive policy for type L agents with positive in ‡ation -convex costs Qualitatively, the nature of the stabilization policy stays the same even if H > 1 since, with both linear and convex costs, the central bank's optimal choice is strictly increasing in ". That is, the central bank still chooses to reduce consumption in low demand states to increase it in higher demand states. However, when we compare Figure 2 with 5 and Figure 3 with 6, we notice that as H L increases, the interval of low-demand states for which type L agents are unconstrained decreases. This in turn leads to an increased distance between the "e¢ cient q L " and the "active
Conclusion
There is substantial empirical evidence showing that QE can have bene…cial real e¤ects on the economy even at the ZLB. Yet, at the same time, showing theoretically that QE can be welfare improving has been di¢ cult to achieve. Our study is motivated by the desire to reconcile these observations. For this reason, we construct a New Monetarist model characterized by aggregate and idiosyncratic demand shocks. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to the idiosyncratic shock, so that in every period some agents are more patient than others. This heterogeneity generates a distribution in asset holdings. We then study the optimal stabilization response of the central bank to demand shocks that hit the economy.
We …nd that several results hold in this environment. First, the ZLB can be the best interest rate policy the central bank can implement although that is not necessarily the case due to a price externality. However, even when the ZLB is the best policy, not all agents are satiated at the Friedman rule and therefore there is scope for central bank policies of liquidity provision.
Second, we study a particular form of QE whereby the central bank purchases private debt via repo arrangements in response to demand shocks. We …nd that such a policy is welfare improving even at the ZLB since it can relax the liquidity constraint of impatient agents without harming the patient ones. We show this is true regardless of whether we have in ‡ation or de ‡ation at the ZLB.
Third, due to a pricing externality, QE can be welfare improving for patient agents even if they are unconstrained at the ZLB.
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Appendix
Conditions for n k jz > 0. We now want to provide conditions that guarantee n k j;z 0 in the constrained-e¢ cient equilibrium with i = 0. Note that if n s HL > 0, then n k jz 0 in all other cases.
We know that x k jz = x for all j; z. This, together with the budget constraint in (8), implies:
From (5), Lemma 1 and (7) the expression above becomes:
Since 1 + 2 = 0 and py = (m H + 1 ) + (1 )(m L + 1 ), rearranging we get:
Note that for = H we have that
Then, in order to have n s HL > 0 it must be that:
Since K > 0, then x must be su¢ ciently bigger than q in order to have n s HL > 0. Note that the necessary di¤erence between q and x will depend on A -a tighter borrowing constraint will generate an incentive to work. (23) we have that the following must hold: 
Proof of Lemma 1 From the Euler equation in
we have that a H = A(1 )= . Since p a = H from (23), then p a = = H .
Proof of Lemma 2
We know from (16) and (18) that "u 0 (q j ) c 0 (y) for j = H; L. This, together with (22), implies that H .
Proof of Proposition 1 From (22) and (18) we know that if
implying type L agents are constrained and q L < q for c 00 (y) 0. From (22) and (18) we also know that if = H then "u 0 (q H ) = c 0 (y), thus implying type H agents cannot be constrained and q H q . Assume q H = q . Since q L < q , then we have that y < y where y = ( b = s )q . With c 00 (y) = 0 this would imply "u 0 (q ) = c 0 (y) = c 0 (y ) since c 0 (y) is constant and therefore q H = q .
With c 00 (y) > 0, instead, y < y implies "u 0 (q ) = c 0 (y) < c 0 (y ). Therefore, it cannot be that q H = q and it must be q H > q .
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal maximizes
subject to the constraints s.t.
and the DM market clearing condition (19). By di¤erentiating the objective function in (30), we know that in order for = H to be the optimal policy, the following condition must hold:
From the Euler equations we know that "u 0 (q H ) c 0 (y) = 0 and "u 0 (q L ) c 0 (y) > 0 at the Friedman rule. Therefore, (32) becomes
which implies the Friedman rule will only be optimal if
0. Now, if we totally di¤eren-tiate the constraints in (31), we …nd the following system of equations has to hold: 2 6 6 6 6 6 4 where the determinant D is
. Using Cramer's rule we have:
then at = H it must be that
< 0, which implies the Friedman rule is always the optimal policy with linear costs. If instead if c 00 (y) > 0, then the sign of
< 0 is indeterminate and therefore the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal. Note that (33) can be simpli…ed as
Therefore, if c 00 (y) > 0 then Dj = H > 0 if and only if c 0 (y) 1. If c 0 (y) 1, then
Proof of Proposition 3
From (22) we have:
Let g L (") denote real aggregate spending of type L agents when their trades are e¢ cient, i.e.
g L (") = b (1 )p(")q ("). Now we want to understand how changes in " a¤ect g L ("):
The …rst term denotes the change in the relative price p(") and the second one changes in the e¢ cient quantity q ("). We can rewrite it as follows:
From (16) we derive that: dp p = 0
The term dq =q , instead, can be derived from
Let's …rst consider the case c 00 (
The RHS of (22) is a function of m L . Note that lim
Since RHS is continuous in m L then an equilibrium exists. The RHS of (22) is monotonically decreasing in m L . To see this use Leibnitz's rule and note that by construction q L ( ") = q (") to get
Since the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in m L , we have a unique m L that solves (34).
Consequently, we have q L (") = q (") if " " and q L (") < q (") otherwise.
The argument is analogous for the case c 00 (y) > 0 and there exists a unique critical value" such that g L (") = m L . However, we know from Proposition 1 that when type L agents are constrained type H ones consume more than q . This implies that q L (") = q (") = q H (") for " " and
Proof of Proposition 4 The Lagrangian for (27) is:
Note that is a function of " because the resource constraint varies state by state. The …rst order condition with respect to q L (") and y(") are respectively as in (42) and (43). Note that, since "u 0 (q H (")) = c 0 (y(")) at i = 0, from the implicit function theorem we know that
Therefore, combining (42), (43) and (35) we …nd that the following expression holds for c 00 (y) 0 :
At this point we need to consider two cases. In the …rst one, m L > 0 and therefore (27) holds with equality so that R > 0. Therefore, "u 0 (q L (")) > c 0 (y(")) in (36), which implies q L (") < q ("). In the second one, m L = 0 and therefore R = 0. This in turn implies "u 0 (q L (")) = c 0 (y(")) in (36), so that q L (") = q H (") = q (").
Derivations for Example 1. We consider the following functional forms:
In this case, the constraints in the optimal in ‡ation problem become:
The derivative of the objective function with respect to yields:
We now need to …nd expressions for dq L =d and dq H =d . If we simplify the expressions in the constraints in (37) and take logs, we …nd that:
. We let " = exp so that ln(") = 1. Then:
By plugging the expressions for dq L =d and dq H =d into (38), we …nd that in order for = H to be optimal it must be that (1 )
Therefore, the following condition must hold: The central bank's problem is as in (27) and the …rst-order condition with respect to q L (") is:
(1 ) "u 0 (q L (")) 1 = " R u 00 q L (");
Note R does not depend on any state " and hence it must be:
This, together with the speci…c functional forms we chose for this example, implies ln(") ln(") = q L (") q L ("). Hence, if " > ", we know that q L (") > q L ("). Now, assume 1 (") = 0. Note that when agents are constrained it must be that q L (") = m L + 1 (") m= and therefore:
With the speci…ed functional forms (39) becomes R = (1 ) " exp q L (") 1 =" exp q L (") and therefore " exp q L = 1 = [1 ]. By taking logs of both hand sides, we …nd that:
Note that with a linear cost function the constraint in (27) becomes:
If we combine it with (40) we have that ( L )= L = b R =(1 R ) and therefore:
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Thus, combining (40) with (41) we …nd that:
, then we have that:
Since " > ", then it must be that 1 (") > 1 ("). Thus, the higher the demand for good, the higher the injection 1 (") needed to …nance the increase in consumption.
Derivations for Example 3. In this example, we focus on convex costs and consider the following functional forms:
As before, the central bank's problem is as in (27). The …rst-order condition for q L (") implies:
The …rst order condition with respect to y(") instead yields: Combining (42) with (43) and the fact that with convex costs dq H (")=dy(") = c 00 [y(")] ="u 00 [q H (")]
and solving for R , we …nd: Second, since R does not depend on any state ", the following condition must hold for all " such that " " " given an arbitrary state ": 
#)
We use this to solve for y(") in terms of y(") for all ". Then, we use the resource constraint (19) to solve for q L (") as a function of y("):
Last, from "u 0 [q H (")] = c 0 [y(")] we …nd an expression for q H (") as a function of y("). With the functional forms we chose, the condition is q H (") = ln(") y(").
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